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Abstract
Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making
problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems
such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct
one-step aggregation of individual decisions is arguably most studied. Another
way to reach collective decisions is by iterative consensus building – allowing
each decision-maker to change their individual decision in response to the choices
of the other agents until a consensus is reached. Iterative consensus building has
so far only been studied for voting problems. Here we propose an iterative judg-
ment aggregation algorithm, based on movements in an undirected graph, and we
study for which instances it terminates with a consensus. We also compare the
computational complexity of our itterative procedure with that of related judgment
aggregation operators.
1 Introduction
Social choice aggregation methods, such as voting [32], are of interest to artificial in-
telligence as methods for collective decision-making among humans and automated
agents alike [3]. Judgment aggregation problems [26] are problems of aggregating
individual judgments on a fixed set of logically related issues, called an agenda. Intu-
itively, an issue is a question that can be answered “yes” or “no.” Alternatively, an issue
is a proposition that can be accepted or rejected. A judgment is a consistent collection
of “yes” and “no” answers, one for each issue. Judgment aggregation has been used to
model collective decision-making in multi-agent systems [2, 39, 41]. It is also interest-
ing because it generalises voting problems, i.e., problems of choosing one option from
a set of available options by aggregating agents’ individual preferences over these op-
tions. A voting problem can be represented as a judgment aggregation problem under
some mild conditions, see e.g. [6, 23].
Aggregation methods produce a joint decision for a group of agents by aggregat-
ing the set of their individual decisions, called a profile, using an aggregation operator.
Another approach to collective decision-making is deliberation, when agents negotiate
which decisions to make. In multi-agent systems, deliberation procedures are con-
structed using an abstract argumentation framework to model relations between deci-
sions, cf. e.g. [35, 20]. A third, comparatively less explored method to reach collective
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decisions is by iterative consensus building: each agent starts with an individual deci-
sion which she then iteratively changes in response to the individual decisions of the
other agents until all agents end up supporting the same decision, i.e., until a consensus
is reached. While in standard aggregation all individual decisions are elicited once,
forming a profile, and after the elicitation the agents can no longer change the profile,
an iterative procedure allows agents to change their decisions many times, even back
and forth.
The existence of judgment transformation functions, i.e., functions that transform
one profile of individual judgments into another profile of individual judgments (pos-
sibly towards consensus) has been considered by List [25]. It was shown that under
a set of reasonable and minimal desirable conditions no transformation function can
exist. Social choice aggregation theory is rife with impossibility results such as this,
yet few specific aggregation operators (that violate some of the desirable conditions)
are proposed. There are more voting operators than judgment aggregation operators,
which is unsurprising since voting is a much older discipline, but the number of judg-
ment aggregation operators is also on the rise. Those include: quota-based rules [7, 9],
distance-based rules [11, 13, 14, 28, 37, 40], generalisations of Condorcet-consistent
voting rules [21, 29, 30], and rules based on the maximisation of some scoring func-
tion [5, 21, 42]. Deliberation and iterative consensus reaching procedures for voting
problems have been explored, e.g., in [27, 24, 17, 18, 34]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, there are no iterative procedures for aggregating judgments. With this
work we aim to fill in the gap.
We consider all possible judgments for an agenda as vertices in a graph. The exis-
tence of an edge between judgments in the graph depends on the relations between the
truth-value assignments on the same issue in the connected judgments. We define three
intuitive agenda graphs. We design an iterative consensus building algorithm which
reaches consensus in the following way: In the first step of the algorithm, each agent
chooses a vertex and lets the other agents know what she has chosen. In each subse-
quent step each agent independently from the other agents moves to an adjacent vertex
if this move reduces her path distance to the other vertices in the profile. The agents
are only allowed to move along a shortest path towards some other agent. The moving
continues until a consensus is reached (i.e., when all agents end up on the same vertex).
We then exploit properties of graphs to study for which subgraphs corresponding to a
profile of judgments the algorithm terminates with a consensus.
Judgment aggregation operators suffer from two shortcomings. First, they are of-
ten irresolute, i.e., more than one collective decision is produced Unlike in voting,
tie-breaking in judgment aggregation is not straightforward and virtually unexplored.
Secondly, deciding if a given judgment is among the possible “winners” of the aggre-
gation is often intractable [23, 12]. The set of tractable aggregation functions is very
limited, exceptions being [7, 9, 13]. An iterative procedure clearly avoids ties when it
reaches a consensus, and this is one advantage of our proposal. We also show that our
consensus-oriented procedure may offer some computational benefits when compared
to standard judgment aggregation rules.
The motivation for our iterative procedure is both descriptive and prescriptive. On
one hand, our algorithm is meant to approximate consensus formation that happens
in human societies. On the other hand, our procedure can be useful for implementing
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artificial agents, as producing a consensual judgment is in some cases distinctly cheaper
than computing the collective opinion in one step elicitation by a standard judgment
aggregation procedure.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the judgment aggre-
gation framework. In Section 3 we define three relevant agenda graphs and recall some
useful concepts from graph theory. In Section 4 we present the algorithm for iterative
judgment aggregation, and discuss necessary conditions for its termination with a con-
sensus. In Section 5 we investigate sufficient termination conditions for each of the
three agenda graphs. In Section 6 we briefly discuss the quality of the reached consen-
sus with respect to some judgment aggregation operators, and study the computational
complexity of the algorithm. In Section 7 we discuss the related work. In Section 8 we
present our conclusions and discuss future work.
2 Preliminaries
We first introduce the basic definitions of judgment aggregation.
Judgments. Let L be a set of propositional variables. An agenda A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}
is a finite set A ⊆ L. The elements of A are called issues. A judgment is a (truth
assignment) function J : A → {0, 1} mapping each issue to either 0 (reject) or 1
(accept). We write {0, 1}A as a shorthand for A → {0, 1}, the space of all possible
judgments for m issues, i.e., all sequences of length m comprised of 0s and 1s. We
use J(ϕ) to denote the value assigned to ϕ ∈ A. The Hamming distance between
two judgments is defined as the number of issues on which the judgments differ, i.e.,
dh(J
a, Jb) = #{ϕ ∈ A | Ja(ϕ) 6= Jb(ϕ)}.
With each agenda we associate a constraint Γ ∈ LA, where LA is the set of well
formed formulas constructed with variables from A and the logical connectives ¬
(negation), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), and → (implication). The formula Γ is
assumed not to be a contradiction. A judgment from {0, 1}A is rational for Γ if and
only if it is a model for Γ in the sense of classical propositional logic. For a given
Γ ∈ LA, we define JA,Γ ⊆ {0, 1}A to be the set of all rational judgments for A and
Γ.
Agents and profiles. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents. A profile P =
(J1, . . . , Ji, . . . , Jn) ∈ J nA,Γ is a list of rational judgments, one for each agent. We
denote P [i] = Ji and P−i = (J1, . . . , Ji−1, Ji+1, . . . , Jn). Further let {P} be the
set of all distinct judgments that are in P . We often abuse notation and write Ji ∈ P
when P [i] = Ji. We reserve subscripted judgments, e.g., Ji, to denote judgments
that belong to some profile and the superscripted judgments, e.g., Ja, Jb, to denote
rational judgments that may not belong to some profile. A profile is unanimous if
{P} = {J}, for some J ∈ JA,Γ. A judgment J is a plurality judgment in P if and
only if #{i | P [i] = J} ≥ #{i | P [i] 6= J}.
Example 1 The quintessential example in judgment aggregation is the “doctrinal para-
dox” which is described with A = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3} and Γ = (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ↔ ϕ3. The
JA,Γ = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)}. The doctrinal paradox profile is P =
3
ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3
agent 1 0 1 0
agent 2 1 0 0
agent 3 1 1 1
majority 1 1 0
Figure 1: Doctrinal paradox
((0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)), see also Figure 1. Note that all the three profile judg-
ments are rational, but the collective judgment obtained by taking the value for each
issue assigned by a strict majority of agents, the so called majority rule, is not rational.
3 Agenda Graphs
An agenda graph is a graph GA,Γ = 〈V,E〉 whose nodes are judgments for some
agendaA, namely V ⊆ {0, 1}A. Given an agendaA and constraints Γ we define three
agenda graphs. The Hamming graph GhA is the graph over all possible (not necessarily
rational!) judgments, that connects vertices which differ on exactly one issue. The
Model graph GmA,Γ is the graph over all rational judgments, where two judgments are
adjacent iff no “compromise” exists between them. The Complete graph GcA,Γ is the
fully connected graph over all rational judgments. Formally:
The Hamming graph is GhA = 〈{0, 1}A, Eh〉where (Ja, Jb) ∈ Eh iff dh(Ja, Jb) =
1.
The Model graph is GmA,Γ = 〈JA,Γ, Em〉 where (Ja, Jb) ∈ Em iff there exists no
judgment Jc ∈ JA,Γ between Ja and Jb. A judgment Jc ∈ JA,Γ is between
judgments Ja ∈ JA,Γ and Jb ∈ JA,Γ when Jc 6= Ja, Jc 6= Jb, Ja 6= Jb and
for every ϕ ∈ A if Ja(ϕ) = Jb(ϕ), then Jc(ϕ) = Ja(ϕ) = Jb(ϕ).
The Complete graph is GcA,Γ = 〈JA,Γ, Ec〉 where Ec = JA,Γ × JA,Γ.
The agenda graphs for the doctrinal paradox of Example 1 are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Agenda graphs for the doctrinal paradox: (a) the Hamming graphGhA, (b)
the Model graph GmA,Γ, (c) the Complete graph GcA,Γ for A and Γ in Example 1.
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We use dx to denote the (shortest) path distance on an agenda graph GxA,Γ. The
path distance on GcA,Γ is also known as the drastic distance: the distance between
two judgments is 0 iff they are the same on all issues and 1 iff they differ on at least
one issue. The path distance on GhA is the Hamming distance, and the path distance
on GmA,Γ is the Model distance introduced and formally characterized in [11]. Recall
that a path distance on a graph GA,Γ, as on any graph, is a distance function in the
true sense since for every Ja, Jb, Jc ∈ V it satisfies: d(Ja, Jb) = 0 iff Ja = Jb,
d(Ja, Jb) = d(Jb, Ja), and d(Ja, Jc) ≤ d(Ja, Jb) + d(Jb, Jc) (triangle inequality).
A graph G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉 is a subgraph of graph G = 〈V,E〉, denoted G′ ⊆ G, if
V ′ ⊆ V and E′ ⊆ E. The V ′-induced subgraph of a graph G is the graph G′ ⊆ G
with vertices V ′ and edges E′ which satisfies that, for every pair of vertices in V ′, they
are adjacent in G if and only if they are adjacent in G′.
We consider profile-induced subgraphs of GA,Γ and make use of their “geometry”.
Therefore we define some useful concepts for a given agenda graph GA,Γ = 〈V,E〉
and agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, following the terminology from graph theory [36].
The interval between a pair of vertices Ja, Jb ∈ V , denoted IA,Γ[Ja, Jb], is the set
of all the judgments on all the shortest paths in GA,Γ from Ja to Jb.
A subset S ⊆ V is convex if it is closed under IA,Γ, namely when it includes all
shortest paths between two vertices in S.
The convex hull of P on GA,Γ, denoted CH(P ), is the smallest convex subset of V
from GA,Γ that contains {P}.
The eccentricity of a judgment Ja ∈ S ⊆ V is eS(Ja) = max{d(Ja, Jb) | Jb ∈ S},
i.e., the farthest that Ja gets from any other judgment in S.
A diameter of a set S ⊆ V is mxd(S) = max{eS(J) | J ∈ S}, namely the max-
imal eccentricity of a vertex in S. All judgments for which mxd(S) = eS(J)
are called peripheral judgments for S. For S = {P} we call these judgments
peripheral judgments of a profile P . If for two judgments Ja, Jb it holds that
d(Ja, Jb) = mxd(P ), then these are called antipodal judgments of a profile P .
Example 2 Consider the Hamming graph GhA for the doctrinal paradox, presented
in Figure 2a, and take the profile P as defined in Example 1. The CH(P )-induced
subgraph of GhA is given in Figure 3; this graph contains all the shortest paths, and
nodes from JA,Γ, between (0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0), between (0, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1), and
between (1, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1). Node (0, 0, 1) is not in this CH(P )-induced subgraph of
GhA because this node is not on any of the shortest paths between the profile judgments.
We have defined the convex hull of P because we will build our iteration algorithm
on the principle of only allowing the agents to move from their current judgment to
an adjacent judgment in the hull of P . By doing this we ensure that the agents do not
disperse away from each other. The Proposition 1 shows that if agents in profile P each
move to a judgment in CH(P ), thus creating profile P ′, the diameter of the P ′ profile
cannot be bigger than that of the P .
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Figure 3: The CH(P )-induced subgraph of GhA for P in Example 1.
Proposition 1 For an agenda graph GA,Γ and profile P ∈ J nA,Γ, if S ⊆ CH(P ), then
CH(S) ⊆ CH(P ) and mxd(CH(S)) ≤ mxd(CH(P )).
Proof This property follows from the fact that CH is a finitary closure operator [36,
p. 6, Theorem 1.3]. Thus, for the convex hull CH(P ), it holds that if S ⊆ CH(P ), then
CH(S) ⊆ CH(CH(P )), and CH(CH(P )) = CH(P ). 
Definition 1 We say that the profile P has a k-cycle in GA,Γ if and only the CH(P )-
induced subgraph of GA,Γ has a simple cycle of length k. We say that P is a k-cycle
in GA,Γ if and only if the CH(P )-induced subgraph of GA,Γ is a simple cycle in GA,Γ
of length k.
The doctrinal paradox profile from Example 1 is a 4-cycle in GmA,Γ, and it has a
6-cycle in GhA, as can be inferred from Figure 2.
We make the following observation.
Observation 2 No profile P ∈ J nA,Γ has a 3-cycle in GhA or in GmA,Γ, regardless of A
and Γ.
This exclusion of 3-cycles is due to the betweenness property of path distances: if
Jb is between Ja and Jc in the graph, then d(Ja, Jc) = d(Ja, Jb) + d(Jb, Jc).
Definition 2 An interval IA,Γ[Ja, Jb] is ǫ-connected inGA,Γ if and only if the maximal
path distance between two adjacent rational judgments in the IA,Γ[Ja, Jb]-induced
subgraph of GA,Γ is at most ǫ ∈ N. A profile P is ǫ-connected in GA,Γ if and only if
every interval IA,Γ[P [i], P [j]] for i, j ∈ N is ǫ-connected in GA,Γ.
While every interval in GcA,Γ and GmA,Γ is ǫ-connected for every ǫ ≥ 1, this may not
be the case for intervals inGhA. As an example, consider the doctrinal paradox profileP
from Example 1 and graph GhA in Figure 2a. Here, the interval IA,Γ[(1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0)]
is 2-connected because every shortest path between (1, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 0) passes only
through judgments that are not rational.
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4 Iteration Algorithm
Collective opinions in human societies are often formed not in one step, but rather in
an intricate process that involves mutual information exchange, argumentation, persua-
sion, and opinion revision. Typically, social agents are motivated by two somewhat
conflicting needs: on one hand, they want to form a unified stance with a significant
enough part of the community; on the other hand, they do not want to concede too
much of their own opinion. Here, we try to mimic this kind of behaviour – obviously,
in a very simplified way. To this end, we design an iteration algorithm, Algorithm 1,
based on an agenda graph GA,Γ. As it is standard in judgment aggregation, we as-
sume that the agents can only chose rational judgments at each iteration step. For an
agendaA and constraints Γ, each agent’s judgment is a node in the graph GA,Γ. In the
first step of the iterative procedure each agent announces which node she has chosen.
Two or more agents may choose the same node. The agents do not have a constructed
GA,Γ available. At each subsequent step, the agents (simultaneously) compute their
adjacent nodes and try to “move” to one of these adjacent nodes along some shortest
path towards the other agents. A move is possible if and only if the adjacent judgment
is rational and it brings the agent closer to the rest of the profile, i.e., it decreases its
aggregated path distance to the other judgments. More precisely, an agent i ∈ N will
move from P [i] to a J iff there exist a rational J ∈ CH(P ) s.t. d(J, P [i]) = 1 and∑
j∈N,j 6=i
d(P [i], P [j]) <
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
d(J, P [j]), where d is a path distance for a givenGA,Γ.
Given a choice between two moves the agent chooses the one which better reduces the
distance to the rest of the profile. If more than one move reduces the distance to the
same extent, the agent chooses using some internal decision-making procedure which
we do not model. We take it that in this case the agent chooses non-deterministically,
with all move options being probable. The agents continue moving along the nodes of
GA,Γ until no agent in the profile can move, or all of the agents “sit” on the same node,
namely until a consensus is reached.
In Algorithm 1, send(Ji, j) informs agent j ∈ N that agent i ∈ N has chosen
to move to node Ji ∈ V , while receive(Jj, i) denotes that the agent i ∈ N has been
informed that agent j ∈ N has chosen to move to node Jj ∈ V . To ease readability we
use
D(i, J, P ) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
d(J, P [j]). We call D(i, J, P ) the distance of J to the profile
P−i. In Algorithm 1, at each iteration t, MOVES is the set of judgments that are strictly
closer to P than the current judgment Ji. Note that the algorithm is fully decentralised, in the
sense that there is no need for any central authority to take over the iteration at any point of the
process.
The starting profile P 0 collects the initial individual opinions of the agents. That is, it is the
profile that would be aggregated under classical one-step social choice. We say that the algorithm
reaches consensus J for P 0, if it terminates starting from P 0 by returning the unanimous profile
{P} = {J}. We first observe a necessary condition for reaching consensus.
Proposition 3 If Algorithm 1 reaches consensus, then P 0 is ǫ-connected for ǫ = 1.
Proof Assume that the algorithm terminates with a J∗-unanimous P at some t. In each t′ < t,
every agent either keeps her own judgment P [i], or moves to a new J ∈ JA,Γ with d(P [i], J) =
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Data: ǫ > 0, JA,Γ, N , own identifier i ∈ N , initial judgment J0i
Result: P ∈ J |N |A,Γ
t := 0; MOVES := ∅; Ji := J0i ; P := empty list;
repeat
P ′ := P ;
P [i] := Ji;
for j ∈ N, j 6= i do
send(Ji, j), receive(Jj , i), P [j] := Jj ;
end
MOVES := argmin
J∈CH(P )∩JA,Γ
D(i, J, P ) ∩
{J | 0 < d(J, Ji) ≤ 1 and D(i, J, P ) < D(i, P [i], P )};
if MOVES 6= ∅ then
select J ∈ MOVES, Ji := J ;
end
t := t+ 1;
until P is unanimous or P ′ = P ;
return P ;
Algorithm 1: Iteration algorithm
1. Since a J∗ is reached by every agent, there must exist a 1-connected path between any two
judgments in P 0. Thus P 0 must be 1-connected. 
Note also that if P 0 is ǫ-connected, so is P at any step t > 0. The interesting question
is: what are the sufficient conditions for reaching consensus by Algorithm 1? We address the
question in Section 5.
5 Reaching Consensus
In this section, we examine the sufficient conditions for reaching consensus by Algorithm 1. We
begin by looking at the iteration over the complete agenda graph GcA,Γ, and then we move on to
the more interesting cases of GhA and GmA,Γ.
5.1 Iteration with GcA,Γ
Theorem 4 If P contains a unique plurality judgment J , then Algorithm 1 always reaches con-
sensus in one step.
Proof On GcA,Γ, the path distance dc between any two judgments that are different is 1. Let J
be the unique plurality judgment in P ∈ J nA,Γ, selected by k agents. For every Ji = J 6= Jj ,
we have D(i, J, P ) = n − k ≤ D(i, P [j], P ), so the agents selecting J can not change their
judgments. Moreover, switching from Jj to J decreases the distance to P−j most, so all the
other agents will switch to J in the first iteration. 
What about starting profiles with several plurality judgments? They converge towards con-
sensus under reasonable conditions.
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Theorem 5 IfN consists of an odd number of agents, then Algorithm 1 probabilistically reaches
consensus, i.e., it reaches consensus with probability 1.
Proof If there is a single plurality judgment in P , then the algorithm converges in one step. If
there are two or more plurality judgments J1, . . . , Jk ∈ JA,Γ, then those agents swap non-
deterministically between J1, . . . , Jk , and the other agents move to one of J1, . . . , Jk . In the
next round, the same argument applies. Eventually, P converges either to the unanimous profile
P ′ such that {P ′} = {J} for some J ∈ {J1, . . . , Jk}, or to a profile P ′′ such that {P ′′} =
{J1, . . . , Jm} for an odd m, each favoured by the same amount of agents. From then on, the
agents keep swapping judgments until one judgment gets plurality in the profile, and wins in the
next round.
Formally, let MOVESi,t be the set of moves available to agent i at the step t of Algorithm 1.
We assume that there is some δ > 0 such that, for each step t, agent i selects judgment J ∈
MOVESi,t with probability pi(J) ≥ δ. Then, there exists δ′ > 0 such that the probability of
all the agents “hitting” a profile with no plurality in the next round is at most 1 − δ′. Hence,
the probability that the profile stays with no plurality in m steps is at most (1 − δ′)m, which
converges to 0 as m increases. 
The Algorithm 1 has good convergence properties on GcA,Γ but the consensus it reaches
is limited to the judgments that are already in the starting profile. On the Hamming and Model
agenda graphs Algorithm 1 surpasses this limitation. However, its convergence becomes a subtler
issue.
5.2 Iteration with GhA and GmA,Γ
In this section, we will use GA,Γ to refer to one of GmA,Γ, GhA in order to avoid stating and
proving the same properties for GmA,Γ and GhA separately when the same proof can be applied.
We start with a negative result. Let us call equidistant those profiles P such that, for any
i, j, r ∈ N with i 6= j, i 6= r, j 6= r, it holds that d(P [i], P [j]) = d(P [i], P [r]).
Proposition 6 Consider N = {1, 2, 3} agents and a 1-connected P 0. If Algorithm 1 reaches a
P that is an equidistant k-cycle, then Algorithm 1 will not terminate with a consensus.
Proof If P is an equidistant k-cycle then no agent can reduce the distance to one agent by 1
without increasing the distance to the other agent by 1. Thus no agent has a possible move. 
J1
J2
J3
Figure 4: An agenda graph of a non-equidistant profile P = (J1, J2, J3)
Note that the same applies to some non-equidistant k-cycles. For example, the profile in
Figure 4 is not equidistant, but it is easy to check that each agent has an empty set of moves.
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3-agent profiles that form a simple cycle are problematic because an agent may not be able
to get closer to one of the other agents without distancing itself from the third. For profiles of
more than three agents that form a simple cycle, the judgments cannot be equidistant, and this is
no longer a problem.
Lemma 7 If P is a (1-connected) k-cycle for n > 3 agents at step t of Algorithm 1, then the set
MOVES at t is nonempty for some i ∈ N .
Proof Take any judgment P [i] which is peripheral in CH(P ), and consider its antipodal judg-
ment P [j]. Let p1,p2 be the two paths from P [i] to P [j] in CH(P ), and let Jm ∈ CH(P ) be
the node adjacent to P [i] on path pm, m = 1, 2. We have that d(J1, P [r]) = d(P [i], P [r])− 1
for every P [r] on p1, while d(J2, P [s]) = d(P [i], P [s]) + 1 for every P [s] on p2. If there
are more profile judgments on p1 than on p2, then J1 ∈ MOVES, otherwise J2 ∈ MOVES.
If there are exactly as many judgments on p1 as there are on p2, then both J1 ∈ MOVES and
J2 ∈ MOVES because in that case d(J1, P [j]) = d(J2, P [j]) = d(P [i], P [j]) − 1 and conse-
quently D(i, J, P ) = D(i, J ′, P ) < D(i, P [i], P ). 
Let us consider the case of a 1-connected P 0 for |N | > 3. Let P be the profile produced by
Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0, and let P ′ be the profile produced by Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. We
begin by showing that for graphs in which no judgment has a degree higher than 2, it is never the
case that P = P ′, i.e., there exist at least one agent for which MOVES = ∅ for P .
Lemma 8 Let P be a profile for n > 3 agents, produced by Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0, and let
P ′ be the profile produced by Algorithm 1 at step t+1. Assume that P is 1-connected on GA,Γ.
If the CH(P )-induced subgraph of GA,Γ is such that no vertex in it has a degree higher than
two, and mxd(P ) > 1, then P 6= P ′.
Proof We show that at least the agent i ∈ N with a peripheral judgment for P has a possible
move in P .
Case a. There exists a peripheral judgment in P with degree 1, belonging to i ∈ N .
Let P [j] be an antipodal of P [j]. Since d(P [i], P [j]) > 1 and P is 1-connected, there
must exist exactly one judgment J ∈ JA,Γ, such that d(P [i], J) = 1 and that is be-
tween judgments P [i] and P [j]. For every r ∈ N , r 6= i it holds that d(J, P [r]) =
d(P [i], P [r])− 1. Thus J is a move for P [i].
Case b. All peripheral judgments in P are with degree 2. Consider the antipodal judgments
P [i] and P [j]. There are exactly two shortest paths connecting them: p1 and p2. All
other profile judgments P [r] are: either on p1, or on p2, or have a shortest path to P [j]
that intersects either p1 or p2, possibly both. We can apply the same reasoning as in the
proof of Lemma 7.
Consider J ∈ CH(P ) adjacent to P [i] on p1 and J ′ ∈ CH(P ) adjacent to P [i] on p2.
We have that d(J, P [r]) = d(P [i], P [r]) − 1 for every P [r] on p1 or whose shortest
path to P [j] intersects p1, while d(J,P [s]) = d(P [i], P [s]) + 1 for every P [s] on p2
or whose shortest path to P [j] intersects p2, but does not intersect p1. If there are more
agents r than agents s, then J ∈ MOVES, otherwise J ′ ∈ MOVES. If there are exactly
as many agents r as agents s, then both J ∈ MOVES and J ′ ∈ MOVES because in
that case d(J,P [j]) = d(J ′, P [j]) = d(P [i], P [j]) − 1 and consequently D(i, J, P ) =
D(i, J ′, P ) < D(i, P [i], P ).

Observe that if the CH(P 0)-induced subgraph on GA,Γ is such that every vertex in it is of
degree at most two, then for every subsequently constructed P in Algorithm 1, it will hold that
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the CH(P )-induced subgraph on GA,Γ is such that every vertex in it is of degree at most two.
This is due to the fact that, at each step of Algorithm 1, the agents can only chose judgments
from the CH(P 0).
From Observation 2 we know that a {P}-induced subgraph of GhA and GmA,Γ does not have
3-cycles. If the CH(P 0)-induced subgraph of GhA, respectively GmA,Γ contains no k-cycles for
k > 3, then this induced subgraph contains no cycles and it is by definition a tree. From the
Case a. of the proof of Lemma 8, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 9 Let P be a profile produced in Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0 and let P ′ be profile
produced in Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. Assume that P is 1-connected on GA,Γ. If the CH(P )-
induced subgraph of GA,Γ is a tree, and mxd(P ) > 1, then P 6= P ′.
Proof The proof follows from the Case a. of the proof of Lemma 8 and the observation that:
all the subgraphs of a tree are trees, and the peripheral vertices of a tree have a degree 1. 
We now need to show that not only the profile changes in each iteration, it also changes
towards a consensus.
From Proposition 1 we have that mxd(CH(P )) does not increase with each step of the
Algorithm 1. It is possible that mxd(CH(P )) = mxd(CH(P ′)) for P ′ being constructed
immediately afterP in Algorithm 1. From the proof of Lemma 8 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 10 Let P ∈ J nA,Γ be a profile produced in Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0 and let P ′ ∈
J nA,Γ be profile produced in Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. If {P} = {P ′}, then the {P}-induced
graph of GA,Γ has at least one k-cycle, where 2m+ 2 ≥ k ≥ 2m.
Clearly if the agents whose judgments are antipodal in P can choose to move towards each
other via two different shortest paths between their judgments causing {P} = {P ′}. These
agents however, also have the possibility to chose to move towards each other on the same
shortest path between their judgments. As soon as two agents use the same shortest path, the
k-cycle will be broken in the next step of the algorithm and {P} 6= {P ′}.
Let us consider the case when mxd(P ) = 1.
Lemma 11 Let P be a 1-connected profile for n > 3 agents at step t with mxd(P ) = 1 and let
P ′ be a profile obtain from it by Algorithm 1 at step t+ 1. If n is odd then {P} 6= {P ′}.
Proof In this case the Algorithm 1 behaves as on the GcA,Γ graph, see Theorems 4 and 5, except
the P -induced subgraf of GA,Γ will have no 3-cycles (or any size cycles since mxd(P ) = 1).
Namely, if there is one plurality judgment J in P , all the agents can reach it, because mxd(P ) =
1 and P is 1-connected. Consequently {P ′} = 1. If more than one plurality judgment exists, the
agents whose judgment is this plurality judgment will not have a move, while and all the other
agents will move to their choice of a plurality judgment. If n is odd P ′ will have exactly one
plurality judgment and the profile P ′′ constructed by Algorithm 1 in step t+1 is a consensus. If
however n is even, as with GcA,Γ, P can be such that half of the agents have a judgment J , while
the other half have an adjacent judgments J ′. Namely {P} = {J, J ′} and d(J, J ′) = 1. If such
P is reached the Algorithm 1 forces the agents to infinitely “swap” between J and J ′. 
Lemma 12 Assume an odd number of agents n > 3. that in the P -induced subgraph on GA,Γ
each vertex has a degree at most 2. Let P ∈ J nA,Γ be s.t. CH(P ) has at least one k-cycle for
k > 3. Let pi(J) > 0 be the probability that an agent i will choose a possible move J from the
set MOVES at a step t1 in the Algorithm 1. Then the algorithm will reach a point t2 > t1 where
P ′ ∈ J nA,Γ is obtained s.t. CH(P ) ⊂ CH(P ′) with probability 1.
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Proof If a profile P ′′ is reached such that all antipodal judgments have degree two, it is sufficient
that only one antipodal pair “breaks” the cycle for a profile P ′ to be reached. To do so, two
agents with antipodal judgments have to chose to move along the same path towards each other.
Consider a pair of antipodal judgments in P , P [i] and P [j]. Assume that at the non-deterministic
step of the algorithm there exists a probability 1 > pi(J) > 0 that the agent i selects J ∈
MOVES that is on a shortest path p between P [i] and P [j] and probability pi(J ′) = 1 − pi(J)
that she selects J ′ ∈ MOVES that is on a different path q between P [i] and P [j]. Similarly,
let those probabilities be 1 > pj(J ′′) > 0 that agent j selects to move to J ′′ on path p and
pj(J
′′′) = 1− pj(J
′′) for the probability that j moves to J ′′′ on some other path q’ (q and q’
may not be the same). Since the agents decide on their moves independently, the probability that
agent i will chose the same path as j is pi(J) · pj(J ′′) > 0. Since the two peripheral judgments
J [i] and J [j] are no longer part of the new profile P ′, {P ′} ⊂ CH(P ) and from Corollary 10
we get that CH(P ) ⊂ CH(P ′) is reached after a finite time with probability 1. 
Let us call Class A for GA,Γ the set of all CH(P )-induced subgraphs of GA,Γ that are tree
graphs. Let us call Class B for GA,Γ the set of all CH(P )-induced subgraphs of GA,Γ whose
vertices have a degree of at most 2. For instance, the doctrinal paradox profile from Example 1
is in Class B for GmA,Γ, see Graph b in Figure 2. On the other hand, it is neither in Class B nor in
Class A for GhA, see Example 2 and Figure 3.
We can now state the following theorem whose proof follows from Lemma 8, Corollary 10,
Corollary 9, Lemma 11 and Lemma 12.
Theorem 13 Let P 0 ∈ J nA,Γ be a 1-connected profile belonging to Class A or to Class B for
GhA or G
m
A,Γ. If n > 3 is odd, and each element of MOVES has a non-null probability of
being selected in the non-deterministic choice step, then the Algorithm 1 reaches consensus with
probability 1 on GhA, respectively GmA,Γ.
6 Properties of Consensus
In this section, we compare the output and performance of our iteration procedure to those of
standard distance-based judgment aggregation rules. We first discuss the “quality” of the con-
sensual decision. Then, we look at the computational complexity of the procedure.
6.1 Consensus Quality
Distance-based judgment aggregation [28, 39, 21, 19] combines an algebraic aggregation func-
tion ⋆ with a distance function d (not necessarily a path distance in some agenda graph) in order
to select the collective opinion that is closest to the given profile. Given P ∈ J nA,Γ, the distance-
based aggregation function F d,⋆ : J nA,Γ → 2JA,Γ \ ∅ is defined as
F
d,⋆(P ) = argmin
J∈JA,Γ
⋆ (d(P [1], J), . . . , d(P [n], J)).
Natural questions to ask are:
• How does Algorithm 1 perform in comparison to F d,Σ when d is a path distance in an
agenda graph?
• How do the collective judgments F d,Σ(P 0) compare to the consensus judgment reached
by Algorithm 1 for a given starting profile P 0?
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The questions cannot be fully explored within the scope of this paper. However, we establish
some initial properties below.
A property generally deemed desirable in judgment aggregation is that of propositional una-
nimity [21, 39, 16]. Propositional unanimity requires that, if every agent in profile P has the
same value for some issue ϕ ∈ A, then the same value for ϕ ∈ A shows up either in at least one
of the judgments in F d,⋆ (weak unanimity) or in all of the judgments in F d,⋆ (strong unanimity).
It is interesting to note that the most popular distance based judgment aggregation rule F dh,Σ
does not satisfy even the weak version of the property [38] and the same applies to F dm,Σ and
F dc,Σ [22]. In this respect, iterative consensus building behaves better.
Proposition 14 If Algorithm 1 terminates with a consensus on GhA, then the consensus satisfies
strong unanimity with respect to the initial profile P 0.
Proof Note that, for GhA, judgment J ′ is between judgments J and J ′′ iff vertex J ′ is on the
shortest path between vertices J and J ′′ in the graph. Consequently, if all the agents in P 0 give
the same truth-value on an issue, then CH(P 0) cannot contain judgments that assign different
truth-value to this issue. 
The same is not the case for GmA,Γ.
Proposition 15 There is an initial profile P 0 such that Algorithm 1 terminates with a consensus
on GmA,Γ, and the consensus does not satisfy weak unanimity with respect to P 0.
Proof As a counter-example consider Example 1 and Graph b in Figure 2. The vertex (1, 1, 1)
is between vertices (0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0), but the judgment (1, 1, 1) is not between judgments
(0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0). Thus the agents can move from (0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0) to (1, 1, 1) thus
violating propositional unanimity on the last issue. 
A big advantage of one-shot distance-based aggregation F d,Σ is that it produces output (a
winner or winners) on any profile P 0, while our Algorithm 1 is more restricted in this respect.
As we have seen, a necessary condition for successful termination of Algorithm 1 is that P 0 is
1-connected. Sufficient conditions are even more restrictive. Still, Proposition 14 demonstrates
that, when Algorithm 1 reaches a consensus, it is structurally “better behaved” then a distance-
based judgment aggregation rule for the most popular approach based on the sum of Hamming
distances. In the next subsection we show that Algorithm 1 is also “better behaved” in the sense
of computational complexity.
6.2 Complexity of Reaching Consensus
An important drawback of distance-based judgment aggregation is the computational complex-
ity of producing the output, i.e., the winning judgment or judgments. The winner determination
problem for F dh,Σ is known to be Θp2-complete [14], and the result extends to most other dis-
tances d and aggregation functions ⋆ [19]. The computational complexity of determining the
collective judgment sets by F dm,Σ is actually not known. How does it work for the iteration
procedure formalized with Algorithm 1?
We have shown that the algorithm reaches consensus for an odd number n > 3 of agents
on 1-connected, not equidistant profiles. How costly is it to reach the consensus? On GcA,Γ, it
is evident that Algorithm 1 performs well, but the resulting consensus is not very exciting. For
the GmA,Γ graph, the consensus-friendly attitude may not earn much in terms of computational
complexity, when compared to F dm,Σ. For each P [i], we need to find every J ∈ JA,Γ s.t. there
is no rational judgment between P [i] and J . It is not difficult to show, by a reduction to coSAT,
that checking whether there is no rational judgment between two given rational judgments is in
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general coNP-complete. This has to be repeated for multiple candidate judgments to compute
the set MOVES, and on top of that with every iteration of the algorithm. As a consequence, we
get the following.
Theorem 16 For GmA,Γ, determining MOVES of a single iteration of Algorithm 1 coNP-hard.
Note that the hardness result is not really due to the iteration procedure, but rather due to the
inherent complexity of computing dm, which requires to determine nonexistence of particular
rational judgments, i.e., to solve the Boolean co-satisfiability problem.
In contrast, the Hamming distance dh can be always computed efficiently. Consequently,
when Algorithm 1 reaches a consensus on GhA, it is also “better behaved” computationally than
the distance-based judgment aggregation rule F dh,Σ. We demonstrate it formally.
Proposition 17 For GhA, a single iteration of Algorithm 1 runs in deterministic polynomial time.
Proof Follows from the fact that the set MOVES can be constructed by checking at most |A|
candidate judgments. 
By Corollary 10, if the CH(P 0) induced subgraph of GhA has no cycles, then the diameter
of CH(P ) is strictly shrinking with each non-terminating step t. In consequence, if Algorithm 1
reaches consensus for such P 0, then it does so in polynomially many steps. However, in case of
cycles in the CH(P 0) induced graph in GhA, the algorithm may run into such a cycle and take
some time until the agents “stray” from the loop. When it happens, any judgment occurring on
the loop can be the consensus. Using this observation, we propose the following modification of
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2: Same as Algorithm 1, only it stops the iteration when {Pt} = {Pt′} for some
t > t′, and non-deterministically chooses one J ∈ {P} as the consensus, producing in the next
step Pt+1 with {Pt+1} = {J}.
Unlike Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 avoids looping and waiting until two or more agents
“move” in the same direction. It also avoids infinite loops in the case of profiles with evenly
many agents. On the other hand, Algorithm 2 is no longer decentralised, which is a clear disad-
vantage. We suggest that it can be treated as a technical variant of Algorithm 1 that potentially
reduces its running time by employing a trusted third party which simulates probabilistic con-
vergence of the profile in Algorithm 1 by one-step non-deterministic choice in Algorithm 2. The
following formal results, which are straightforward consequences of our analysis above, justify
the suggestion.
Theorem 18 Consider GhA and N such that |N | is odd and larger than 3. If Algorithm 1 can
reach consensus with J then also Algorithm 2 can reach consensus with J .
Theorem 19 Consider GhA and N such that |N | is odd and larger than 3. Moreover, let P 0 ∈
J nA,Γ be 1-connected and not equidistant. Algorithm 2 reaches consensus from P 0 on GhA in
deterministic polynomial time.
Lastly, let us observe that checking whether P 0 is equidistant can be done in linear time of
the number of agents. For a graph G, determining if it has a simple cycle of size k, for k fixed,
is a polynomial time problem over the size of G, see [1], however we do not generate the full
GA,Γ when (or before) we run the iteration algorithm.
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7 Related Work
List [25] considered judgment transformation functions τ : J nA,Γ → ({0, 1}A)n as means
to building iteration procedures for judgment aggregation problems. He showed that for a set
of desirable properties no transformation functions exists. Such impossibility results exist for
judgment aggregation functions, however, by relaxing some of the properties, specific judgment
aggregation operators have been constructed: quota-based rules [6], distance-based rules [37,
28, 14, 11], generalisations of Condorcet-consistent voting rules [30, 29, 21], and rules based on
the maximisation of some scoring function [21, 5, 42]. To the best of our knowledge, specific
iteration procedures for judgment aggregation problems have not been proposed in the literature.
List [25] argues that the desirable conditions for judgment transformation functions should
satisfy the following properties: universal domain, rational co-domain, consensus preservation,
minimal relevance, and independence. Universal domain is satisfied when the transformation
function accepts as admissible input any possible profile of rational judgments. Rational co-
domain is satisfied when the function always outputs a profile of rational judgments. Consensus
preservation is satisfied when τ always maps unanimous profiles into themselves. Minimal rel-
evance is a weak property. It is satisfied when for each P [i] there exists a profile P ′ to which P
can be transformed such that P [i] = P ′[i]. In other words, the transformation function should be
such that it does not allow one agent to never change her judgment regardless of what the other
profile judgments are. Lastly independence is satisfied when for each agenda issue, J ′i(ϕ) de-
pends only on J(ϕ), and not on J(φ) for some other φ ∈ A; J ′i = P ′[i], Ji = P [i], P ′ = τ (P ).
Each step of Algorithm 1 can be seen as a (distributed) function that transforms an input
profile into an output profile, namely as a List judgment transformation function. Given a profile
P ∈ JA,Γ, let Td(P ) = {P ′ | P ′ ∈ J nA,Γ, d(P [i], P ′[i]) ≤ 1, i ∈ [1, n]}. We can define the
transformation function τd that maps a profile P ∈ J nA,Γ to a profile P ′ ∈ Td(P ). Although
Algorithm 1 does not terminate for each profile, τd does satisfy universal domain in the case
of GcA,Γ and GmA,Γ, because each step of the algorithm transforms the profile (possibly into
itself). Universal domain is not satisfied on GhA because profiles on this graph do not always
satisfy the necessary conditions for termination with a consensus. The rational co-domain and
the consensus preservation properties are also trivially satisfied. It is not difficult to show that
the minimal relevance property is also satisfied. Independence is the desirable property that
is violated, and in fact List [25] argues that relaxing independence is the most plausible path
towards avoiding the impossibility result.
In voting, deliberation and iterative consensus have been studied, although perhaps not ax-
iomatically. As most similar with our work we distinguish [18] and [15]. Voting problems can
be represented as judgment aggregation problems, see e.g., [6, 23], therefore it is possible to
compare these works with ours. First we show how voting problems are represented in judgment
aggregation.
A voting problem is specified with a set of agents N and a set of candidate options O =
{x1, x2, . . . , xm}. LetO be the set of all total, transitive, and antisymmetric orders over the ele-
ments of O. A vote≻ is an element ofO and a voting profile is a collection of votes, one for each
agent in N . The preference agenda Ao is constructed by representing each pair of options xi and
xj , where i < j with an issue xiPxj . The constraint Γtr is the transitivity constraint defined as
Γtr =
∧
xiPxj,xjPxk,xiPxk∈Ao
(
(xiPxj) ∧ (xjPxk) → (xiPxk)
)
. For each vote ϕ ∈ O we
obtain a rational judgment J≻ such that J≻(xiPxj) = 1 iff xi ≻ xj and J≻(xiPxj) = 0 iff
xj ≻ xi.
A Condorcet winner for a voting profile, when it exists, is the option that wins the majority
of pairwise comparison for every other option in O, see e.g., [32]. The corresponding concept
in the judgment aggregation representation of a voting problem is called majority consistency.
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A judgment profile is majority-consistent if the judgment obtained by taking the value for each
issue assigned by a strict majority of agents in the profile is rational. The doctrinal paradox
profile from Example 1 is not majority-consistent. It was shown [23, 31] that if a judgment
profile on the preference agenda is majority-consistent, then the corresponding voting profile has
a Condorcet winner.
Hassanzadeh et al. [18] consider an iterative consensus algorithm for voting profiles. In their
algorithm, each agent is allowed to (simultaneously with other agents) move from vote≻i to vote
≻ if she can flip the order of two adjacent options without violating transitivity. This corresponds
to the agents moving to an adjacent judgment in the agenda graph GhAo,Γtr . Hassanzadeh et al
consider the majority graph for a voting profile (for an odd number of agents): the vertices in
this directed graph are the elements of O and there is an edge from xi to xj if there are more
agents in the profile who prefer xi to xj than agents who prefer xj to xi. The majority graph
corresponds to a judgment J ∈ JAo,Γtr for which J(xiPxj) = v, v ∈ {0, 1} if there is a strict
majority of agents r ∈ N for which Jr(xiPxj) = v, Jr = P [r]. Hassanzadeh et al show
that their algorithm terminates with a consensus on the Condorcet winner when the majoritarian
graph has no cycles. If the majority graph of a voting profile has no cycles, then the voting profile
has a Condorcet winner.
Goel and Lee [15] consider an iteration procedure in which the agents “move” along adjacent
vertices along (what corresponds to) the graph GmA,Γ. They do not commit to the nature of their
vertices, so they are not exactly judgments or alternatives, just allowed options for iteration. In
their algorithm not all agents move individually, but three agents at a time first reach a consensus
and then all three move to the consensus option in the graph. Goel and Lee consider line graphs,
graphs in which two vertices have degree 1 and all other vertices have degree 2, and show that
the consensus produced by their algorithm is the generalised median. Namely, if the options
in their algorithms were judgments from JA,Γ the consensus their algorithm reaches for these
graphs is an approximation of F dm,Σ.
Both [18] and [15] offer interesting directions for future study in context of our algorithm:
to consider the profiles that have a Condorcet winner (see e.g., [23] for the concept of Con-
dorcet winner in judgment aggregation) and to consider triadic iteration, allowing three agents
to coordinate their moves with respect to each other and then see when a consensus emerges.
It is an open question of how our algorithm would perform on the special case of voting
problems represented in judgment aggregation. The GhAo,Γtr graph on the preference agenda
has a more regular topology in comparison to general judgment aggregation problems, it is a
permutahedron. For example, for an agenda of three options, the graph GhAo,Γtr is a cycle of
length 6. For every J, J ′ ∈ JAo,Γtr , dh(J, J ′) = dm(J, J ′), thus the necessary conditions
for reaching consensus for Algorithm 1 would be satisfied even on GhA because every profile
on the preference agenda and judgments rational for the transitivity constraint is 1-connected
in GhAo,Γtr . The graph G
m
Ao,Γtr always has
|O|·(|O|−1)
2
vertices and each of these vertices has
a degree |O| − 1. We leave for future work the study of whether our algorithm terminates for
voting profiles. In particular, we conjecture that the Algorithm 1 for an odd number of agents
will converge on the Condorcet winner in the case of voting profiles from the single crossing
domain [4], also studied in judgment aggregation [8]. This is because profiles in this domain
would have a hull whose induced graph is a line on GhAo,Γtr .
Lastly, we must mention [33]. Obraztsova et al [33] consider a graph similar to our Hamming
agenda graph. They work with preferences, not judgments, but most importantly, the vertices of
their graph are elements of (what would correspond to) J nA,Γ, i.e., the vertices are profiles of
votes. There exists a connection between two profiles if one profile can be obtained from the
other by making exactly one swap between adjacent options in one vote. Obraztsova et al [33]
study the properties of voting rules with respect to the “geometry” of the profiles in their graph.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a decentralised algorithm for iterative consensus building in judgment
aggregation problems. We study the termination conditions for this algorithm, some of its struc-
tural properties, and its computational complexity.
In order to reach a consensus, our algorithm exploits the topology of a graph. All the avail-
able judgments that the agents can chose from are vertices in the graph. The algorithm models
an agent’s change of mind as a move between adjacent judgments in the graph. We define three
natural graphs that can be constructed for a set of rational judgments JA,Γ: the complete graph
GcA,Γ, the Hamming graph GhA, and the model agenda graph GmA,Γ. We prove that our algorithm
always terminates for an odd number of agents on the graph GcA,Γ, but it necessarily selects one
of the judgments proposed in the first round of iterations. For the graphs GhA and GmA,Γ we show
a class of profiles for which the algorithm terminates with a consensus and a class of profiles for
which it does not terminate with a consensus.
If the agents initially chose judgments such that the convex hull of the profile of these judg-
ments induces a subgraph of GhA, or GmA,Γ in which each vertex has a degree of at most 2, then
our algorithm probabilistically terminates with a consensus for an odd number of (more than 3)
agents.
The list of profiles we give here, for which Algorithm 1 terminates with a consensus, is
clearly not exhaustive. For example, it is easy to show that, for an odd number of agents, Algo-
rithm 1 terminates with a consensus if the CH(P 0) induced subgraph of GhA, or GmA,Γ, is such
that it contains only k-cycles, where k = 2 · mxd(P 0) + 1. This is because for such profiles
there exists at least one pair of antipodal judgments with degree no more than 2 who will have a
nonempty set MOVES. An immediate direction for future work is to strengthen our results with
other classes of consensus terminating agenda graph topologies, particularly those corresponding
to profiles on the preference agenda (and transitivity constraints).
A step of our algorithm implements a judgment profile transformation function of the type
defined in [25]. List [25] gives an impossibility characterisation of such functions. Our function
“escapes” this impossibility result by not satisfying the independence property on all agenda
graphs and the universal domain on GhA.
While GcA,Γ, and GmA,Γ satisfy the necessary conditions for termination of Algorithm 1 for
any A and Γ, this is not the case with GhA, which is why the transformation function fails to
satisfy universal domain on GhA. On GhA, sometimes all the adjacent judgments to a rational
judgment J are not rational and thus not allowed to move to. In our future work we aim to
explore modifications of the algorithm allowing the agents to make “longer” moves, i.e., to
“jump over” a vertex that is not a rational judgment.
In Section 6 we gave two results with respect to the quality of the consensus reached by
Algorithm 1 with respect to the widely used distance-based aggregation function F dh,Σ. This
function F dh,Σ is also known as the median aggregation rule and it is widely used in many
domains, e.g., generalises the Kemeny voting rule, see [23], and for measuring dissimilarity
between concepts in ontologies [10]. We merely scratched the surface of this consensus quality
analysis and this line of research merits further attention.
Lastly, a more long-term goal for our future work is to explore versions of iteration on an
agenda graph where the agents do not try to move to reduce the path distance to all of the other
agents, but only to their neighbours in a given social network, or as in [15], to two randomly
selected two agents.
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